St. John's Law Review
Volume 75
Number 2 Volume 75, Spring 2001, Number 2

Article 19

Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime
Kathryn M. Carney

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTES

RAPE: THE PARADIGMATIC HATE CRIME
KATHRYN M. CARNEY"

INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday, October 7, 1998, twenty-two year old
Matthew Shepard was found unconscious and tied to a fence in
the Wyoming countryside, his body severely beaten and burned.
Shepard, who was gay, had met two men at the Fireside Lounge,
a Wyoming bar, earlier in the evening. Both men told Shepard
they were also gay, and persuaded him to leave the bar with
them. When Shepard entered a pick-up truck with the two men,
he was "pistol-whipped... until his skull collapsed."' Five days
2
later, Shepard died without waking from the resulting coma.
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Colgate
University.
1 Howard Fineman, Echoes of a Murder in Wyoming, NEWSWEEK, October 26,
1998, at 42.
2 See E.N. Smith, Gay Man Beaten in 'Cowboy' Wyo., ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 10,
1998, at Al (depicting the Shepard murder); see also Fineman, supra note 1, at 4243; Steve Lopez, To be Young and Gay in Wyoming, TIME, Oct. 26, 1998, at 38;
Robert W. Black, Beaten Gay College Student Dies, Hous. CHRoN., Oct. 13, 1998, at
A-1. One of the convicted killers of Matthew Shepard, Aaron James McKinney, who
was facing a possible death sentence, is currently serving two consecutive life terms
as a result of a deal approved by Shepard's parents. See McKinney to Serve Two Life
Terms, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Nov. 4, 1999. The other killer, Russell

Henderson, entered a guilty plea earlier in the year to avoid the death penalty. See
Julie Cart, Killer of Gay Student is SparedDeath Penalty, LA.TIMES, Dec. 31, 1990,
at Al. The duo was charged with first-degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated
robbery-neither was prosecuted under a hate crime law. See id. Currently, Dennis
Shepard and his wife Judy are advocating the passage of the Hate Crimes
Prevention Act. See Jennie Arnold, Trial, Triumphs, and Errors: President Clinton
Talks About His Successes, Battles and Hopes, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 7, 2000, at 30
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In June 1998, in Jasper, Texas, James Byrd, Jr., a forty-nine
year-old African-American father of three, was brutally
murdered. Three white men, passing by in a truck picked up Mr.
Byrd, who was, ironically, walking down Martin Luther King, Jr.
Boulevard. The three men severely beat Mr. Byrd with a
wrench, chained him by his ankles to their truck, and dragged
him for nearly three miles, leaving bloodstains in their wake.
Law enforcement officials found dismembered parts of his body
spread along the country road, and his mangled torso in an
3
African-American cemetery.
On December 6, 1989, Marc Lepine marched into an
engineering class at the University of Montreal.
After
separating the class by gender and screaming, "I want the
women," he opened fire with a semi-automatic rifle. He left the
classroom, passed through the corridors and into the cafeteria,
killing a total of fourteen women during his rampage. He
reasoned, "[F]eminists [have] ruined my life."4
(opining that Shepard's parents are "obviously not left-wing activists, just
mainstream, hardworking Americans").
3 See Sonja Garza, Fear,Shame Grip Rural Town, DAILY NEWS, June 10, 1998,
at 5 (describing James Byrd's horrific murder and the fears of the community where
this crime occurred); see also Susan Molinari, Racial Murder in Jasper County,
Texas, Painful For African-American and White Community Alike (CBS television
broadcast, June 13, 1998). The three defendants, Lawrence Brewer, Shawn Berry,
and John King were all convicted of capital murder. The addition of the charge of
kidnapping made the defendants eligible for the death penalty and enabled jurors to
sentence the defendants to death. See generally Claudia Kolker, Texas Jury Finds
Third Man Guilty in DraggingDeath; Courts: The FinalDefendant is Convicted in a
1998 Crime That Shocked the Nation, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 19, 1999, at A-20.
The jury convicted all three of capital murder but spared Berry the death penalty
and instead he was sentenced to life imprisonment with eligibility for parole in
forty-years. See id.
But if horror at Byrd's murder was nearly universal, opinion on how to
handle it wasn't. To some civil liberties groups... the crime showed Texas'
need to beef up its hate crime law. Yet Texas' Legislature has failed to
change the law, and hate crime law in general remains an issue of debate
across the nation.
Id. For another chilling account of a racial hate crime, see David Todd Smith,
Enhanced Punishment Under the Texas Hate Crimes Act: Politics, Panacea, or
Pathway to Hell?, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 259 n.2 (1994). Smith relays the story'of
June 7, 1991, when three intoxicated white supremacists patrolled the streets of
Arlington, Texas, looking for an African-American because they felt like killing one
in a drive-by shooting. See id. In their search they came across two white men and
Donald Thomas, an African-American, sitting in the back of a flatbed truck. See id.
As the three white supremacists passed the flatbed, they fired a single shot, at point
blank range, from their shotgun; Thomas was immediately struck and killed. See id.
4 JACK LEVIN & JACK MCDEViTT, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY
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In August 1997, twenty-one year old Patrick Langbelle, went
on a weeklong rampage and spray-painted swastikas and
derogatory racial slogans on the outside walls of several
buildings including Temple Jeremiah in Northfield, Illinois. He
also used an indelible marker to write anti-Semitic slogans on
park benches. Most troubling was his recruiting of seventeen
juveniles into his neo-Nazi group, and his urging that they
engage in similar acts of vandalism. 5
These accounts illustrate what are considered to be
prototypical hate crimes 6 -crimes committed against individuals
killing the women, Lepine turned the gun on
himself. See id. The police recovered a suicide note in Lepine's pocket explaining his
killing spree. See id. Lepine had been declined admittance into the military and
denied admission into the engineering program at the University, both of which he
blamed on "feminists." See id.
5 See Brian Cox, Neo-Nazis Tied to North Shore Hate Crimes, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
30, 1997, at 5; see also Barnes: Crimes Bill Sends Message Governor Signs New
Legislation, Set to Take Effect in July, AgainstActs Spawned by Prejudice,AUGUSTA
CHRON., Mar. 31, 2000, at B-2 (noting that the defacement of a Synagogue prompted
Governor Roy Barnes of Georgia to sign a new hate crimes law). Langbelle was
charged with two separate hate crimes violations as well as compelling membership
into an organization and contributing to the delinquency ofjuveniles. See id.
For a compelling tale of religious motivated crime that pre-dated the recognition
of hate crimes, see NATHAN C. BELTH, A PROMISE To KEEP: A NARRATIVE OF THE
AMERICAN ENCOUNTER WITH ANTI-SEMITISM 59 (1979) (recounting the story of a
young Jewish man named Leo Frank, who was charged with the rape and murder of
a young child whose body was found in the factory he managed). The jury was
threatened with death unless they brought in a verdict of guilty and the judge was
similarly threatened if he did not pass a sentence of death. See id. Leo Frank was
convicted by jury and sentenced to death. See id. Governor of Georgia, John M.
Slayton, however, commuted Frank's sentence. See id. The enraged mob could not
tolerate seeing the Jew alive, so twenty-five men took Frank from the jailhouse and
hanged him from an oak tree. See id.
6 For other examples of prototypical hate crimes, see Terry A. Maroney, The
Struggle Against Hate Crime:Movement at a Crossroads,73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 564, 566
n.7 (1998) (citing JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE 39-57 (1987)) (describing the
1954 murder of 14-year old Emmet Till, an African-American boy from Chicago who
was kidnapped and shot in Mississippi after allegedly saying, 'Bye-baby" to a white
woman in a grocery store); National Asian Pacific Am. Legal Consortium, 1994
AND BLOODSHED 90-91 (1993). After

AUDIT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS 6 (1995) (telling how

Vincent Chin, a Chinese American, was murdered in the 1984 after being mistaken
for a "Jap"; Americans at this time blamed Japan for the decline of the American
auto industry); see also LEVIN & MCDEVITT, supra note 4, at 1-5 (describing the
murder of Alan Berg, a Jewish radio personality in Denver by several members of a
Neo-Nazi group); Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, "On the Basis of Sex:"
Recognizing Gender-Based Hate Crimes, 5 STAN. L & POLy REV. 21, 23 (1994)
(describing four crimes of extreme cruelty and depraved violence that would
typically be considered hate crimes); David Van Biema, When White Makes Right,
TIME, Aug. 9, 1993, at 40 (portraying the gruesome murder of Hattie Mae Cohens,
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because of their race, religion, sexual orientation, gender, or
ethnicity.7 In recent years, legislatures have turned their
attention to hate crimes and have enacted legislation aimed at
eradicating such victimization. 8 Virtually every state has, to
some extent, enacted legislation banning hate crimes. 9 The
rationale for such laws is that hate crimes exact a greater toll on
their victims, as the victim is targeted on the basis of an
immutable characteristic. The victim, therefore, is unable to
prevent the attack, resulting in an increased sense of
vulnerability' ° not only for the victim, but also for other
members of that community, or possessors of the same
immutable trait.
Hate crime statutes vary in which types of bias-motivated
crimes they penalize. Some states penalize only institutional
vandalism committed with a bias motive."1 Other states take a
more inclusive view of hate crimes, and include, in addition to
institutional vandalism, any bias-motivated violence based upon
the victim's race or ethnicity. 12 Some states go further and
consider crimes motivated by the victim's sexual orientation as
crimes of hate. 13 Although many states have included gender as
an African-American lesbian, and Brian Mock, a white disabled gay man by three
white supremacist skinheads in 1992).
7 See Elizabeth A. Pendo, Recognizing Violence Against Women: Gender and
Hate Crimes StatisticsAct, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 157, 157 (1994).
8 See Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crimes Laws, Charts, and Graphs, at

www.adl.org/99hatecrime/provisions.html.
9 See id. (listing Wyoming as the only state without any form of hate crime
legislation and describing all the statutes in existence across the nation).
10 See Kristin L. Taylor, Treating Male Violence Against Women As A Bias
Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 586 (1996) (noting that hate crimes exact a greater cost
on their victims than do non-bias parallel crimes).

11See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 8. (noting that Hawaii, Indiana,
Kansas, New Mexico, and South Carolina use this model).
12 See id. (noting that Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,

California,

Colorado,

Connecticut, Washington D.C., Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Mississippi, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North

Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin consider crimes based on the victim's race, religion or ethnicity as hate
crimes).
13 See id. (noting that Arizona, California, Connecticut, Washington D.C.,
Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin are among the more

progressive states). The most progressive states, Georgia, Utah, and Texas, all
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a protected class in their hate crime statutes, 14 prosecutions of
gender-motivated crimes as hate crimes are rare. 15 When
gender-motivated crimes are prosecuted as hate crimes, they
generally include claims of sexual harassment and battery, but
16
rarely charges of rape.
Yet rape is the paradigmatic hate crime. It is a crime that
violates and defiles millions of women because of their gender,
'and still fails to be recognized as a hate crime. Like other hate
crime victims, the rape victim is selected because she possesses
an immutable characteristic-her gender. 8 Like other hate
crimes, rape inflicts grave psychological consequences upon the
specify that any form of bias-motivated violence will be prosecuted as a crime of
hate. See id
14 See id. (noting that Alaska, Arizona, California, Washington D.C., Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington and West Virginia include gender as a protected class in their
respective hate crime legislation).
15See Julie Goldscheid, Gender-Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigmfor Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 129-30 (1999)
(stating that there is a notable lack of reported cases involving gender bias). For
incidents of gender-bias crimes being tried as hate crimes see Beliveau v. Caras, 873
F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (denying a motion to dismiss a woman's claim
of gender bias pursuant to the civil component of California's hate crime law after
finding the defendant's conduct was sexual harassment); O'Connell v. Chasdi, 511
N.E.2d 349, 353-54 (Mass. 1987) (denying a motion to dismiss a woman's sexual
harassment claim under the state's civil bias-crime law); Massachusetts v. Aboulez,
No. 94-0985H, at 1-2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1994) (finding that the battering of
a woman was a hate crime because of ample evidence of gender-motivation such as
derogatory remarks and past history of girlfriend and spousal abuse).
16 See supra notes 14 & 15.
17 See DIANE CRAVEN, PH.D., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SELECTED
FINDINGS: FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME, NCJ-162602 (Dec. 1996) (finding

that one out of every two hundred and seventy women are raped); see also Lynn
Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the
Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 439, 448 (1993) (noting the results of
Rape in America, a nationwide study directed at reporting the incidence of rape in
America and finding that 12.1 million women are raped annually); Brande Stellings,
Note, The Public Harm of Private Violence; Rape, Sex, Discrimination and
Citizenship, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185, 197 (noting that a rape transpires once
every five minutes nationally) (citing Staff of Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess., Report on Violence Against Women: The Increase of Rape in America iii
(1990)); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, July 2000, at http'//vww.ncjrs.org/txtflilesl/nij/
181867.txt (taking into account significant underreporting, this survey notes that
4.7 million women are raped more than one time).
18 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 17 (noting that the incidence of both
rape and physical assault affect approximately 834,732 women annually).
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victim and results in an increased sense of communal fear. This
Note will argue that rape should be considered and prosecuted
as a crime of hate. Rape is not an act of violence that simply
happens to women-it is an act of hate that happens to women
because they are women. 19
Part I of this Note will define the characteristics of hate
crimes in general and provide an overview of existing bias-crime
laws and the purposes behind them. It will also detail the
history surrounding hate crime legislation.20 Part II of this Note
will give a brief history of rape law reform. Part III of this Note
will discuss the problem of rape in America, and argue that rape
fits within the doctrinal framework of hate crime laws and,
therefore, should be considered a crime of hate. Accordingly,
states that have not yet included gender as a protected category
within their hate crime statutes should do so, and states that
have already included gender as a protected category should
start prosecuting rape under those statutes. As a method of rape
law reform, prosecuting rape as a hate crime will appropriately
subject perpetrators to higher sentences. More significantly,
reclassifying rape, as a crime of hate, will validate the victims'
experiences, transform social norms, and specifically express
society's anger and disgust.
I.

HATE CRIMES

A hate crime generally refers to a crime committed because
of hostility on the part of the accused toward the group to which
the victim belongs. 21 The recently enacted New York Hate
19 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections On Sex Equality Under the Law,

100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301 (1991) (stating that "women are sexually assaulted
because they are women.., because of their membership in a group defined by
gender").
20 Throughout this paper the terms "hate crimes," "bias-crimes," and "gendermotivated crimes" will be used interchangeably.
21 See, e.g., Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the
Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 N.W. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016
(1997) ("Bias crimes.., are crimes committed because of the race, color, or religion
of the victim."); see also Maroney, supra note 6, at 564 ("Hate crime may be defined
as acts of violence motivated by animus against persons and groups because of race,
ethnicity, religion, national origin or immigration status, gender, sexual orientation,
disability (including, for example, HIV status), and age."); Pendo, supra note 7, at
157 (stating that "violence aimed at people because of their race, religion, sexual
orientation, gender, or ethnicity are crimes of hate-crimes that 'leave a stain on our
Constitution'") (quoting 131 Cong. Rec. H5988, H5991 (daily ed. July 22, 1985)
(statement of Rep. Mineta)); Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 23 ("[T]he premise
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Crimes statute defines a hate crime as an offense in which the
perpetrator:
(a) intentionally selects the person against whom the offense is
committed or intended to be committed in whole or in
substantial part because of a belief or perception regarding the
race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious
practice, age, disability or sexual orientation of a person,
regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct, or
(b) intentionally commits the act or acts constituting the offense
in whole or in substantial part because of a belief or perception
regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender,
religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation
of a person, regardless of whether the belief or perception is
correct.

22

To fully comprehend the scope of the hate crime problem, it
is necessary to examine the legislation enacted to combat it and
to become familiar with the characteristics that define a hate
crime.

A

Hate Crime Legislation

Because of the growing number of offenses 23 in which
perpetrators had selected their victims based on each victim's
membership in a particular category, the states and the federal
government began to aggressively combat these "heinous and
invidious" 24 criminal activities on both the state and federal
level. The individual states started to wage their war against
hate crimes in the mid-1980s, enacting enhancement legislation
underlying bias crime statutes is that... offenders select their victims based on the
victim's membership in a particular status category.").
22 The New York Hate Crimes Act of 2000, N.Y. S.B. 4691, 223d Sess. (NY
2000).
2 See Craig Peyton Gaumer, PunishmentFor Prejudice:A Commentary on the
Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to the Problem of Hate

Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) ('The prevalence of hate crimes is undoubtedly
rising."); see also James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Hate Crimes: A Critical
Perspective, 22 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1-5, 13 (1997) (questioning whether there truly is
a wave of hate crimes that are equivalent to an epidemic or whether there is simply
a heightened awareness in recent years causing people to believe there is an
epidemic; they conclude that the latter is the reality); Weisburd & Levin, supra note
6, at 27 (helping to understand and discuss the "epidemic of gender related crime as
it presently exists").
24Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 23 (noting that hate crimes are heinous
and invidious because in effect they are crimes that subjugate entire groups to
subordinate status).
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to deter bias-motivated crimes. 25 These enhancement statutes
typically provide additional punishment for a defendant who
selected a victim based upon national origin, race, or religion.26
A few states provide for additional punishment if the perpetrator
selected his victim because of sexual orientation, disability, or
gender.27 The various state statutes differ not only by the
categories they protect, but also in the remedies or penalties
they implement. 28 The most popular approach is for states to
provide for a criminal sanction and implement an enhanced
penalty system modeled after the Anti-Defamation League hate
crime legislation. 29 The enhanced penalty is intended to reflect
the greater toll exacted on the community by the bias-crime. 30
This greater harm is evidenced by the impact felt by the victim
and the secondary harm, which affects the larger community.
One commentator noted, bias-crimes have become recognized as
a way of "instill[ing]i... fear and distrust in the target group in
order to keep it in a role of subordination."3 ' This increased toll
is also apparent because it diminishes one of the bases upon
which our nation was founded: the guarantee of equality for all. 32

2 See Anti-Defamation League, Hate Crime Statutes: A 1991 Status Report 25 (1991) (detailing the model hate crime legislation and noting that more than half
of the state enacted legislation mirrors this model); see also Andrew M. Gilbert &
Eric D. Marchand, Note, Splitting the Atom or Splitting Hairs-TheHate Crimes
Prevention Act of 1999, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 931, 932-37 (1999) (describing the
history of hate crime legislation and the need for additional federal legislation);
Maroney, supra note 6, at 567-68, 589-90 (1994) (describing the development of
model statutes and hate crime jurisprudence).
26 See Maroney, supra note 6, at 589-590 (defining enhancement statutes); see
also Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 25, at 935.
27 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text; see also Gilbert & Marchand,
supra note 25, at 934; Anti-Defamation League, supra note 8 (illustrating which
states have statues that protect certain characteristics).
28 See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 8 (noting that one state has only a
civil action remedy for the victims of a hate crime, sixteen states impose a criminal
penalty on the perpetrator of a hate crime, and twenty-seven states have both a civil
remedy and a criminal penalty available).
29 See id.
30 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 10, at 586 ("Because bias crimes exact a higher
cost on the target group and society as a whole, society should punish these crimes
accordingly."). Some scholars believe that the enhanced penalty is also justified by
the enhanced culpability of the perpetrator. For a more thorough discussion of this
philosophy, see Dillof, supra note 21, at 1019 ("[A]ll justifications for the increased
penalties imposed by bias crime statutes can be analyzed as taking bias to be
relevant to either the gravity of wrongdoing or degree of culpability.").
31 Taylor, supra note 10, at 585.
32 See id. at 586 (suggesting bias-crimes inhibit the attainment of equality).
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The federal government, acknowledging the harm that hate
crimes inflict, 33 has also begun to take steps to provide a remedy
to the hate crime problem. First, the Hate Crimes Statistic Act
of 199034 was enacted to help determine the actual extent of
hate-related offenses, and to help facilitate the collection of such
data. 35 The Act charged the Attorney General with the task of
collecting data about crimes that manifested evidence of
prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity
from local agencies. 36 In particular the Attorney General was to
collect data on certain bias-motivated acts including murder,
non-negligent manslaughter, rape, assault, arson, and
vandalism. 3 7
The Act also established guidelines for the
collection of such data, including the necessary evidence and
criteria for a finding of manifest prejudice. 38 This act was
designed to work in conjunction with The Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, 39 a 1968 federal measure designed
to protect individuals from violence based upon perceived race,
religion, color, or origin.40 The Hate Crimes Statistic Act was
implemented to update section 245 and to provide new protection
41
on the basis of gender, disability, and sexual orientation.
In 1993, Congress enacted the Hate Crimes Sentencing
42
Act.
The Act directed the United States Sentencing
Commission to promulgate or amend existing sentencing
guidelines to provide three offense levels where the finder of fact
33 See White House Fact Sheet, U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 19, 2000 (noting that in
1998, nearly 8,000 hate crimes were reported, almost one hate crime an hour).
President Clinton was quoted as saying that "[tlhis year America needs action. No
one should be victimized because of how they look, how they worship, or who they
are." Id.

34 See Hate Crime Statistic Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994)).
35 See id.
36 See id.; see also Maroney, supra note 6, at 594; Gilbert & Marchand, supra

note 25, at 935.
37 See supra note 35.
38 See id.

39 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1994).
40 See id.; see also Linda L. Ammong, DiscretionaryJustice:A Legal and Policy
Analysis of a Governor's Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated
Battered Women, 3 J.L. & POLY 1, 5-6 n.10 (1994) (discussing how 28 U.S.C. § 534

amended 18 U.S.C. § 245).
41 For a full discussion of background and history, see Ammong, supra note 40.
42 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (amended 9/21/93) (codified in part at 28
U.S.C. § 994 (1994)); see also Maroney, supra note 6, at 594-95 (discussing the Hate
Crimes Sentencing Act); Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 25, at 937-38 (same).
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at trial determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime
constituted a hate crime. The amended sentencing guidelines
3
went into effect in 1995.4
In 1994 Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act,
(VAWA), 44 designed to supplement, rather than replace, existing
state and federal remedies and to provide a federal remedy for
the victims of gender-motivated violence. 45 The policy behind the
VAWA was that "[all persons within the United States shall
have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by
gender."46 The VAWA created a private right of action to protect
this civil right:
A person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State)
who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus
deprives another of the right to [be free from such violence]
shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery
of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
47
appropriate.
This section of the VAWA was, however, recently found to be
unconstitutional. In United States v. Morrison48, the United
States Supreme Court found that in enacting this legislation,
Congress had exceeded the scope of both its Commerce Clause
authority as defined in the U.S. Constitution in Article I, section
8, and its authority pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
49
Amendment when it enacted this legislation.
43 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, at 521 (1998).
See Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-138 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981) (1994)).
45 See id.
46 Id. In 1994 Congress passed the Civil Rights for Gender Motivated Violence
Act (GMVA). See id.
47 Id.
48 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
49 For an in depth discussion of the unconstitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981,
see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). This case involved the rape of a
Virginia Polytechnic Institute (Virginia Tech) female in a freshman dormitory by
two football players. The Supreme Court found that Congress had not exercised its
powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause and accordingly held that the rape was
not committed as a result of gender animus. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-19.
Christie Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia Tech, had been invited to a party in
a room the floor below hers in the dormitory. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ., 935 F.3d 779, 782 (W.D. Va. 1996), reuld, Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F. Supp. 949 (4th Cir. 1997), rehg en bane, 169
F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, Brzonkala v. Morrison, 527 U.S. 1068 (1999).
44
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Finally, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999 (HCPA),50
which has failed to pass Congress, is designed to make federal
prosecution of hate crimes more practicable. The 1968 Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act contained a jurisdictional
hurdle that required: (1) the victim to be engaged in certain
"federally-protected activities" at the time of the crime, and (2)
51
that there be a connection between the crime and the activity.
This jurisdictional requirement made it virtually impossible to
52
bring federal prosecutions based upon discriminatory motives.
The HCPA therefore sought to eradicate the "federally protected
activity requirement" from Section 245. 53
The HCPA
unfortunately failed, 54 and it remains difficult to bring a bias-

After spending a few minutes at the party she attempted to leave and the
defendant, Morrison, pinned her down by her elbows with his hands, pressed his
knees against her legs, and forced her to have sex with him. See id. Before
Brzonkala could recover, a second football player came and exchanged places with
Morrison, proceeded to rape Christie and when he was through he once again
switched places with Morrison, who raped her for a third time. See id. Afterwards,
Morrison told Christie that she "better not have any fucking diseases." Id. Five
months later Morrison was heard in the cafeteria bragging that he liked to "get girls
drunk and flick the shit out of them." Id. The school took minimal action by
suspending one of the athletes for a semester but shortly after reinstated the
student and dropped the charges. See id
50 See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998: Hearings on S. 1529 before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 6 (1998) (noting that the HCPA sought
to eradicate the "federally-protected activity requirement" from section 245, which
would facilitate federal prosecutions).
51 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1968).
52 See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1998, supra note 50, at 5 (testimony of
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General) (declaring the jurisdictional hurdle
that was near impossible to surpass as one of the deficiencies of section 245; this
was evidenced in light of the number of bias incidents federal prosecutors were
precluded from prosecuting).
53 See id. at 6.
54 See Press Conference with House Minority Leader Representative Richard
Gephardt, in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 12, 2000 (noting that the bill passed
the Senate in June of 2000, by a by-partisan vote of 57-42, but the bill failed to pass
because House leaders were against hate crime legislation and refused to vote
because they felt like such legislation would allow federal intrusion into local police
matters). Note, however, that the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, renamed the Local
Law Enforcement Act of 2000, extends basic hate crime protections to include
sexual orientation, gender, and disability in addition to race, religion, and national
origin. See id. The new act provides that the resources of the federal government
would be available to assist local law enforcement agencies in investigation and
prosecution of hate crimes. See id.
On September 13, 2000, the House of Representatives joined the Senate and
voted to pass a procedural motion that would promote the Act. By doing so,
Congress reaffirmed the notion that all Americans are deserving of protection from
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crime case at the federal level because of these jurisdictional
requirements. 55
Although these statutes vary in regard to which social
groups merit protection and what the appropriate punishment
scheme ought to be, they have a common goal of combating biascrimes. Additionally, all hate crime legislation shares the
characteristic of intolerance. Both at the state and federal level,
the purpose of enacting these statutes is to send out the message
that any crime motivated by discrimination weakens our nation's
ideological foundations, and therefore simply cannot be tolerated
56
by our society.
B.

The Hate Crimes Paradigm

A determination of whether criminal conduct is motivated
by bias can be elusive. Occasionally, in hate crime offenses the
offenders will admit their bias motivation. 57 In most instances,
however,
determining bias involves
an inquiry into
circumstantial evidence and an examination of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the offense.58 In recent years, the
bias-motivated crime and showed that the sudden fear of federal intrusion was
suspect at best. See Jeff Mandell, Nation's Largest Jewish OrganizationApplauds
House Step Toward Passing Hate Crime Legislation, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 13,
2000. On October 5, 2000 the proposed legislation was dropped from the defense
spending despite President Clinton's stated belief that this was a "serious mistake".
Hate Crimes Legislation Dropped From Defense Spending Bill, THE CRIMINAL LAW
REPORTER, Oct. 10, 2000, at 35.
55 See supra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
56 See Maroney, supra note 6, at 586; see also Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6,
at 27 ("The very existence of bias-crime statutes sends out a clear message to society
that a discriminatory motivation for a crime is a proscribable evil in and of itself;
one that we as a society will not tolerate."); supra note 22 and accompanying text
(noting the language of New York's recently enacted Hate Crimes Act 2000). New
York's 2000 hate crime legislation reads,
[Tihe legislature finds and determines as follows: criminal acts including
violence, intimidation and destruction based upon bias and prejudice have
become more prevalent in NYS in recent years .... Current law does not
adequately recognize the harm to our public order and individual safety
that hate crimes cause. Therefore, our laws must be strengthened to
provide clear recognition of the gravity of hate crimes and the compelling
importance of preventing their recurrence.
Id.
57 See Smith, supranote 2, at Al.
58 See Julie Goldscheid, Gender Motivated Violence: Developing a Meaningful
Paradigmfor Civil Rights Enforcement, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 123, 130-32 (1999)
(discussing the use of the totality of the evidence in determining if a bias-crime has
been committed).
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legal community has begun to recognize bias crimes as
possessing certain characteristics that speak as evidence of a
bias motivation: selection of victim because of an immutable
characteristic; interchangeability of the victim; increased fear
among the target group; heightened impact on the community
resulting in communal fear; heightened psychological trauma to
the victims; an underreporting by victims; serial nature of the
attacks on victims and by perpetrators; and an increased level of
59
violence.
1.

Immutable Characteristic

A bias-crime perpetrator selects his victim based on the
individual's immutable characteristic; that is, a trait that cannot
be changed. 60 It is because of this immutable characteristic that
the victim cannot rationalize his attack as the result of his own
actions or in-actions. 61 Since the attack is not the result of any
action taken by the victim, or any random criminal activity, but
is based instead upon an immutable characteristic, the victim
becomes poignantly aware of her own vulnerability. 62
Regardless of any precautions taken, the victim feels that she
lacks control over her personal safety and individual life because
she cannot change the characteristic that prompted the original
63
attack.

59 Many commentators have come to consider any number of characteristics as
indicative of a hate crime. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 23-26 (stating
that calling on increased psychological trauma, increased communal harm,
interchangeability ofvictim, terroristic effects on both the individual victim and the
larger class to which the victim belongs, and uncooperative victims, as indicators
that a bias-crime has transpired); see also Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime
Statutes: A Promising Tool For Fighting Violence Against Women, 2 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 63 (1994) (calling on interchangeability of victims, lack of motive,

excessive violence, and immutable characteristics as indication of a hate crime).
60 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 24.
61 See LEVIN & MC DEVIUT, supra note 4, at 13 (finding that victims cannot

ensure their safety by avoiding certain behavior); see also Joseph M. Fernandez,
Bringing Hate Crime Into Focus: The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, 26 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 287 (1991) (stating that "[tihere is nothing this person can do;
indeed there is nothing this person ought to do to change about his or her race,
religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation").
62 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 161 (noting that victims of hate crimes feel
helpless because the crimes are not motivated by the victims' actions).
63 See LEVIN & MCDEVITT, supra note 4, at 13.
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Interchangeability of Victims

Because the motivating factor behind the attack-for
instance gender-is common to a larger group of people,
individuals within the target community become poignantly
aware of their own vulnerability. All women suddenly realize
that they could be interchanged with the actual victim of the
crime because they share the common trait.6"
3.

Increased Fear to the Target Group
In the perpetrator's mind, lines of individuality are
indistinguishable and each member of the target group may be a
potential victim for a bias-motivated crime. 65 It is this aspect in
particular which causes hate crimes to instill terror in the
victim's smaller community. 6 6 The target community's fear is
largely a reflection of the realization of their own vulnerability
and the acknowledgement that 'it could have been me.' This
feeling of vulnerability results from the fact that the community
shares the same immutable characteristic with the victim that
prompted the bias attack. As one scholar has noted, "In effect,
an attack inspired by animus says in unequivocal terms to each
member of the victim's group that 'the same thing could happen
to you.' "61
4.

Communal Fear
Some scholars have commented that hate crimes are far
more serious than other crimes that do not involve prejudice
simply because bias-crimes are intended to intimidate an entire
64 See Peter Finn, Bias Crime: A Special Target For Prosecutors, THE
PROSECUTOR 10 (Spring 1988) (finding that the fear hate crimes generate can
"victimize a whole class of people").
65 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 579; see also Frederick M. Lawrence, The
Punishment of Hate: Moving Toward A Normative Theory of Bias-Motivated Crimes,
93 MICH. L. REV. 320, 322 (1994) (noting that an additional harm results because a
personalized threat is felt by persons other than the immediate victim).
66 For a general discussion of the idea that bias-crimes inflict a palpable harm
on the target community (for example all women) of the crime as well as society at
large (both men and women) because the reaction of the target community goes
beyond mere sympathy with the immediate bias-crime victim and exceeds empathy
as well, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 221 (1990) (arguing that empathy is the key to
combating discrimination in the US); see also Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 24
("[B]ias crimes instill a broad-based fear on all members of the victim's group.").
67 LEVIN & MCDEVITT, supra note 4, at 97.
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community. 68 Bias-crimes instill a broad sense of communal fear

within societies. 69 Even people that are not directly threatened70
by such bias related violence suffer fear and anxiety.
Primarily, this anxiety results because such crimes violate
society's general concern for the security of its members and
their property. 71 This heightened impact is most clearly
recognized when one examines the national reactions to recent
hate crime incidents. For example, the murder of Matthew
Shepard did not draw national attention only because it was
gruesome. Rather, the great degree of national attention to the
incident is properly attributed to the motivation behind the
crime and the subtle psychological affects such motivation has on
members of society.
Heightened Psychological Trauma
The victim of a bias-crime experiences complete degradation
and vulnerability. 72 The most traumatic aspect of being a victim
of a hate crime is that the person must endure, "not only the
increased level of violence itself, but also a lingering sense of fear
and vulnerability."73 It is this increased and omnipresent sense
of vulnerability that causes a bias-crime victim to exhibit greater
trauma than a non-bias-crime victim. According to one survey,
bias-crime victims experience twenty-one percent more
74
physiological symptoms than victims of non-bias crimes.
Similarly, another study shows that bias-crime victims suffer far
5.

See Pendo, supranote 7, at 157.
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (stating that "bias
inspired conduct ... is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm").
68

69

70 See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE

24 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that people that are not directly threatened by bias attacks
suffer increased anxiety that is the result of the "breakdown of community order
and civility in their surroundings"); see also Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 26

(stating that bias-crimes attack the social order of a community and the resulting
distrust instilled in a victim can polarize communities).
71 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 65, at 347 (1994) (noting that bias-crimes
violate society's general concern for security and also the egalitarian ideal and the
anti-discrimination principle that have become fundamental to the American
culture).
72 See Fernandez, supra note 61, at 262 (emphasizing the emotional harms
extending beyond the physical injury or resulting property damage).
73 Pendo, supranote 7, at 160.
74 See Weisburd & Levin, supranote 6, at 25 (citing the results of the National
Institute Against Prejudice & Violence, National Victimization Survey (1989)).
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greater psychological harm than do victims of non-bias crime. 75
This increased trauma manifests itself because the victim is
selected based on his or her very identity, which, in-turn, leads
to increased self-blame. 76 This increased sense of blame very
often results in low self-esteem, feelings of helplessness,
depression, profound sadness, lack of trust, societal withdrawal,
excessive fear of personal and familial safety, increased use of
drugs and alcohol, and suicidal tendencies. 77 What is most
troubling about the psychological trauma inflicted on victims of
bias-crimes is that the "trauma is never final; recovery is never
78
complete."
6.

Underreporting by Victims of Bias-Crimes
Commentators have noted that "[b]ias crimes are also
characterized by severe underreporting by victims."7 9
For
certain groups of victims the rate of unreported incidents reaches
as high as ninety-percent.80
This underreporting of biasmotivated victimization is the result of embarrassment, shame,
or belief that the authorities cannot do anything to remedy the
injustice done.8 1 Many victims decline to follow through with
initial legal reports because of the trauma that results from
82
dealing with the ill-equipped, unsympathetic justice system.
75 See Kent Greenwalt, Reflections on Justificationfor Defining Crimes by the
Category of Victim, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 617, 627 (describing the "special
injury" that results because of the victim's knowledge that the attack was motivated
by racial animus); see also Arnold Barnes & Paul Ephross, The Impact of Hate
Violence on Victims: Emotional and BehavioralResponses to Attacks, 39 Soc. WORK
247, 250 (1994) (noting that the emotional responses of hate crime victims range
from profound sadness to anger or fear).
76 See Linda Garnets et al., VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION OF LESBIANS AND
GAY MEN: MENTAL CONSEQUENCES 207, 209 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill
eds., 1992); see also Susan E. Martin, A Cross Burning Is Not JustAn Arson: Police
Social Construction of Hate Crimes In Baltimore County, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 303, 305
(1995) (describing the difficulty a bias-crime victim has accepting his victimization,
due to the fact that he believes the crime is based on his very identity).
77 These are only a few of the resulting phobias and syndromes suffered at the
hands of a bias-motivated perpetrator. For a more detailed discussion of the
resulting problems, see Joan Weiss et. al., National Institution Against Prejudice &
Violence, Ethnoviolence at Work, 18 J. INTERGROUP RELATIONS 21, 27 (1991-1992).
78 Schafran, supra note 17, at 446.
79 Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 26.
80 See id. (citing Brian Levin, A Theoretical & PracticalOverview, 4 STAN. L. &
POLY REV. 165, 178 n.13 (1992)).
81 See id.
82 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 26 ("[TIrauma result[s] from availing
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Others feel that they will be exploited and humiliated at the
83
hands of skeptical defense attorneys.
7.

Serial Nature of Attacks and Recidivist Rate of Assailant

Victims of bias-crimes typically fall prey to multiple
attacks,8 4 since bias-crimes often involve multiple attacks
against the same victim or the same class of victims.8 5 Studies
have shown that as many as two-thirds of bias-crime victims
experience
recurring
attacks.8 6
Similarly, bias-crime
perpetrators tend to commit multiple attacks over a long period
87
of time.
8.

Heightened Violence

Generally, bias-crimes are more violent than non-bias
motivated crimes, 88 and thus typically require hospitalization. 89
For example, nearly seventy-five percent of bias-crime victims
will suffer an injury at the hands of an attacker while the
national average for personal injuries sustained in all other
crimes that are not bias-motivated is only twenty-nine percent. 90
Similarly, victims of bias-crimes require hospital treatment four
times as often as victims of non-bias crimes. 91 These statistics
reflect the primary goal of a bias-crime: intimidating and
degrading an entire class of individuals.92
themselves of an often unsupportive, uncaring or unsympathetic legal system.").
83 See id. ("[The personal degradation of the victim often becomes the subject of
legal maneuvering as defense counsel attempts to find a benign justification for the
attack, including an intense examination of the victim's actions.").
84 See Taylor, supranote 10, at 584.
85 See generally Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 26 (noting that many biascrime victims suffer attacks more than once); Taylor, supra note 10; Lawrence,
supra note 65, at 320.
86 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 584 (discussing the two-thirds statistic).
87 See Barnes & Ephross, supra note 75, at 249.
88 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 23; see also BRIAN LEVIN, A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO BIAS CRIMES 3-4 (1992).
89 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 23 (stating that a bias assault is

"twice as likely to involve injury to the victim and four times as likely to require
hospitalization").
90 See Daniel Goldman, Hate Crimes Matter of Turf, Researchers Say, CHI.
TRIB. June 1, 1990 at C29.
91 See LEVIN & MC DEVITT, supra note 4, at 11 (noting that thirty-percent of
bias-crimes result in hospital treatment while only seven percent of parallel crimes
require the same).
92 See Angelari, supra note 59, at 66 ("[TMhe intent of such hate-based crimes is
to control and terrorize the members of... groups.").
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RAPE AND HATE

Brief History of Rape Law Reform

In the eighteenth century rape was defined as "carnal
knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will."93 Under
this traditional approach, the female had to prove that she did
not consent and that the sexual act was "by force" or "against her
will." 94 Generally speaking, it was sufficient proof of force if one
could demonstrate that the male used, or threatened to use, force
likely to cause serious bodily injury to the female. 95 In addition
to these requirements, there was another element that had to be
present for a rape conviction to stand: the victim had to have
resisted the male's aggression and have been overcome only by
96
force or threats to her safety.
Until the 1950s this approach to rape was almost uniformly
applied in the United States and because of the difficulty of
establishing the necessary requirements, few prosecutions were
successful. 97 Despite these hurdles, the legal establishment
remained fearful of false reports, 98 and so the courts imposed
heightened proof requirements 99 including: an immediate
reporting to the authorities by the victim of the alleged incident;
93 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210
(London: Cavendish Publishing, Ltd. 2001) (1765).
94 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 577 (3d ed. 2001).

95 See id.
96 See id. The one exception to these definitional requirements of rape was
known as the marital immunity doctrine. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 29-30 (1998). This
exception was based on the notion that a virgin daughter was owned by her father.
See Deuteronomy 22:28-29 (discussing the punishment of paying fifty shekels to the
father, "owner," and a forced marriage to the daughter if one raped a virgin).
Consequently, the rule was a manifestation that the husband took over for the
father upon marriage and came to own the sexual rights of his wife and therefore a
husband could not be charged with a violation of his own rights. See DRESSLER,
supra note 94, at 588.

97 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96, at 18-20; see also Erin Motley and

Christina Wells, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of
Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 146 (2001) (noting a 1973 study that
found men who committed rape had between a two and thirteen percent chance of
being convicted).
98 See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of
a FairTrial in Rape Prosecutions,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1028 (1991) (noting
that only two-percent of rape reports prove to be false and that the justice system is
adequately equipped to determine such falsehoods early on).
99 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96, at 18.
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corroboration of the victim's story, usually by a medical
examiner; and a qualification of utmost resistance by the victim
to the assailant's aggression. 10 0 In hindsight, scholars have
noted that it was the resistance requirement that likely
prevented successful prosecutions of rape cases. 01' For example
in Whittaker v. State, 10 2a woman was held down and threatened
with a revolver. 0 3 After numerous attempts to cry out and
escape, she became physically exhausted and no longer able to
fight to save herself; she reluctantly submitted. 104 The court
found this submission, despite the reluctance surrounding it, to
be insufficient to sustain a rape conviction because the woman
did not resist to the utmost extent.105
Disheartened by the likelihood of defeat and the belief that
rape laws were archaic, the American Law Institute (ALI) began
to draft reform proposals. 06 These proposals were aimed at
eliminating the requirement of resistance, dividing rape into two
separate offenses: stranger rape and acquaintance rape, and
abolishing any mention of consent. 0 7 The hope was that if
consent was not examined, but rather the actions of the
defendant were the focus of the interrogation, the jury would not
become preoccupied with whether the victim "asked for it."108
The ALI used the term forcible compulsion, 109 expanding the
definition of force, and kept the focus upon the defendant and
made the presence of force determinative of whether the woman
consented. 1 0 If she submitted because of physical force or the

100 See id. at 18-19 (detailing the various proof requirements).
101 See id. at 17-46.

7 N.W. 431, 431-33 (Wis. 1880).
See id.
104 See id. For a further discussion of the force requirement and its application
in Whittaker, see SCHULHOFER, supra note 96.
105 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96.
106 See id. at 20-21.
107 See id. at 21.
108 See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
109 Forcible compulsion was included as a way to show that there was a lack of
consent. Under the New York Penal Law's definition of forcible compulsion,
implying non-consent can be satisfied by showing one of two things: (1) the
defendant used actual physical force to compel the victim; or (2) there was a threat,
either implied or expressed, that placed the victim in fear of immediate death or
physical injury (meaning physical impairment or substantial pain) to him/herself or
another person. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney 1998).
102
103

110 See SCHULHOFER, supranote 96, at 23.
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threat of physical force, lack of consent was implied."'
The ALI's work provided a framework for much of the
reforms that occurred during the 1960's.112 The reforms of the
1960's did not eliminate the marital exemption, the requirement
of corroboration, the demonstration of non-consent, or the
requirement of immediate reporting." 3
But many states
following the lead of the ALI began to minimize the need to show
resistance by including the requirement of forcible compulsionmaking force determinative of non-consent. 114 This inclusion
resulted in a fixation upon the physical violence surrounding the
alleged rape, but the problem of what is force or how much force
is enough persisted 115 and rape prosecutions continued to fail.
1 6
Accordingly, criticism of the existing rape laws intensified.
The next generation of rape-reform activists believed the
problem with the law was largely the result of social convictions
that were ingrained in the criminal justice system." 7 For
example, prosecutors and police officers often felt that women
who dressed provocatively, engaged in suggestive behavior,
consumed alcoholic beverages, or had lost their virginity prior to
the incident essentially got what they deserved by being
raped." 8 Any indictments that were able to overcome these
early-stage prejudices of officials were met with additional
prejudice at trial where rape cases were often the subject of
abusive and degrading cross-examinations and procedural
abuses of defense counsels." 9 Rape reformers of the 1970s,
therefore, aimed to eliminate rules of evidence that hindered
rape prosecutions. 120 By the mid-1970s the corroboration rule
and cautionary instructions given to jurors 121 were largely

1Ml See id.

See id.
See id. at 24.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 25. For examples of failed prosecutions that were tried in the
1960s and 1970's, see id. at 24.
117 See id. at 25 (stating that "[u]nwanted sexual imposition was not in itself a
crime--or even an aberration").
112
113
114
115
116

118 See id.
119 See id. at 26-29.
120 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96, at 29-30 (noting that "in the course of the
1970's virtually every state repealed these discriminatory rules").
121 See id. at 18-19 (noting that the cautionary rule instructed jurors that they
must examine the victim's story with great precaution).
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eliminated. 122 Another feat of the 1970s reforms was the
development of rape shield laws that protected a rape victim
while on the witness stand by limiting the scope of questions
that could be asked. 2 3 Despite these great strides, most states
retained the spousal immunity privilege, although it was
softened or eliminated in certain states. 124 Similarly, the
majority of states retained a resistance requirement albeit less
restrictive, of only reasonable resistance, while other states
abandoned the requirement altogether. 125 Unfortunately, the
reforms had little practical effect when examined in light of
126
cases prosecuted under the new reforms.
While the 1960s reforms eliminated a per se inquiry into the
victim's consent by asking whether there was forcible
compulsion, 127 and the 1970s eliminated some procedural
barriers, problems remained-namely, the definition of forcible
compulsion. 128 In virtually all states, rape laws remained
limited to situations of actual or potential physical violence, 29
which prevented a great number of "actual rapes" from meeting
the threshold requirements necessary to sustain a conviction.
Often a woman, fearing for her safety, would submit and have no
physical wounds that were prototypical of a "real" rape, no knife
marks, black eyes, broken-nose, bruises on the throat or
scratches. Thus, her "story" would not meet the forcible
compulsion requirement.
Some jurisdictions have taken
122 See id. at 30. The reason behind this cautionary rule was the societal idea
that rape charges are "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
defended by the party accused tho' never so innocent." SIR MATrHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN, I, LVIII 635 (R.H. Small ed., 1847).
w See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96, at 30.For example, under state rape shield
laws the past sexual history of the victim, apart from prior relations with the
defendant, cannot be addressed. See id.; see also Frank Tuerkheimer, A
Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1245 (1989).
124 See id.; DRESSLER, supra note 96, at 580-81 (noting that the common law
resistance rule was unjustifiable because women react differently in rape situations,
and requiring a woman to fight back would substantially increase her risk of
sustaining serious injuries).
125 See id.
126See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96, at 33 (describing major changes in the law
that "had surprisingly little practical effects"). For cases exemplifying the practical
failure of the reforms see State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981), State v. Alston,
312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984); People v. Hearn, 300 N.W.2d 396 (Mich. App. 1981).
127 See SCHULHOFER, supranote 96, at 31.
128 See DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 582-30.
129 See SCHULHOFER, supra note 96, at 44. (stating that only New Jersey has
abandoned the force requirement).
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innovative approaches to remedy this problem. For example, in
a few jurisdictions a rape prosecution may stand on the basis of
lack of consent by the female and the force required inherent in
the sexual act. 130 In yet another jurisdiction there is no force
requirement whatsoever, and a rape conviction will stand on the
31
basis of the female's lack of permission for the intercourse.
Nevertheless, the typical current definition of rape includes
three elements: proof that a proscribed sex act occurred
(typically penetration); proof that force, actual or threatened,
was used to perform the act; and proof that the act occurred
32
without the consent or against the will of the victim.
Unfortunately, rape victims are still met with disbelieving
ears and faced with numerous hurdles. Therefore, reform of
rape law is still very much needed. 133 In light of the prevalence
130 See

State v. Brown, 420 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. 1992).

131See State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (stating that

physical force is not required in addition to "involuntary or unwanted sexual
penetration."). In taking this approach, New Jersey adopted the Wisconsin scheme.
See Major Timothy W. Murphy, USAF, A Matter of Force: The Redemption of Rape,
39 A.F. L. REv. 19, 23 (1996).
The statutory requirements regarding force and nonconsent vary among
jurisdictions. In Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington,
and Wyoming, only force is included in the statutory definition of rape. See Michelle
J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 1000-01
n.280 (1998). In Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, and Utah only
nonconsent is included in the definition. See id. at 1000-01 n.281. Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
York, North Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice list both force and consent in the statutory definition of
rape. See id. at 1001 n.282. Tennessee and Vermont "appear to require a version of
either force or non-consent." Id. at 1001 n.283. In most jurisdictions, regardless of
these distinctions, rape will be found if both force and non-consent occur; if only one
occurs rape will not be found. See id. at 1001.
132 See State v. Thomas, 731 A.2d 532, 536 (N.J. App. Div. 1999). If physical
force, or the threat of such force, is found, such as would overcome the will of a
reasonable woman, then lack of consent is assumed and does not have to be
individually proven.
133 See Phylis Skloot Bamberger, Never Underestimate the Injury in Rape, N.Y.
TImEs, Mar. 9, 1990 (Editorial), at A34. Bamberger states,
The suggestion that the rape itself is not a "serious injury" is beyond
comprehension ....The physical violence inherent in rape is generally no
longer belittled, but the attitude that is expressed in your articles
[describing a rape victim as "cut on arms and hands but not seriously
injured"] is a reflection of an unfortunate view of community attitudes
lurking below the surface.
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of rape, the next step in rape reform is justified. In the United
States alone, rape violates and defiles one out of every 270
women 134 because they are women, 135 affecting 12.1 million
women annually, 136 4.7 million women more than once, 137 and
transpiring once every five minutes nationally. 138 Society needs
to accept that rape is a violent, terrorizing crime that occurs not
because women ask for it, neither is rape any less "real" simply
because the woman is able to walk away from the crime without
visible scars.

134 See CRAVEN, supra note 17.
135 Rape is a problem, and not an insignificant one, which also affects men.

When compared to the rape of women, however, it is obvious that the occurrence of
male rape and the occurrence of female rape are problems of far different
magnitude. One study suggests that approximately 10,000 men are raped annually.
See JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE: THE MISUNDERSTOOD
CRIME 48 (noting the results of an unspecified 1988 U.S. Department of Justice
report). When compared to the 12.1 million women that are raped annually, the
problem of female rape is far more prevalent. See Schafran, supra note 17, at 448.
Another study reveals that approximately 33,000 men and 432,000 women are
raped annually. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sex Differences in Violent Victimization,
1994, at http-//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/sdvv.txt. Regardless of the statistical
data one relies upon, it is clear that the commission of rape against women is a
more prevalent problem than the rape of men. This conclusion is buttressed by the
sad reality that a number of studies reveal that the males most likely to be raped
are those under the age of 13. See Arthur Kaufnan et al., Male Rape Victims:
NoninstitutionalizedAssault.137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 221, 221 (1980) (noting that
less than ten percent of females that are raped are under the age of thirteen, while
at least fifty percent of reported rapes of males are committed against boys thirteen
or younger). These figures suggest that a large number of rapes committed against
males would be more appropriately categorized as child abuse. See J. James et al.,
PhysicianReporting of Sexual Abuse Children, 240 J.A.MA. 1145, 1145-46 (1978).
Child abuse is a problem that plagues our nation, but would be best treated as a
separate and distinct crime than the rape of a non-consenting adult.
Another distinction between female rape victims and male rape victims is that a
good number of male rape victims are raped as an aberration of prison life or as a
violent outgrowth of the homosexual subculture. See generally SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (Simon and Schuster

1975). This does not suggest that rape of males outside of child abuse, prison life,
and homosexual violence does not exist, as it certainly does. But the rape of men is
far less frequent or commonplace of a problem than the rape of women. See CRAVEN,
supra note 17 (noting that the victimization of men exceeds women in all crimes
except that of rape and sexual assault).
136 See Schafran, supra note 17, at 448 (noting the results of Rape in America, a
nationwide study directed at reporting the incidence of rape in America).
137 See id.; see also TJADEN &THOENNES, supra note 17; CRAVEN, supra note 17
(noting that victimization of men exceeds women in all crimes except rape).
138 See Stellings, supra note 17.
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Rape as a Crime of Hate

Fortunately, reforms were able to transform conceptions of
rape from a crime of uncontrolled sexual passion to a crime of
violence. 139 The next step in rape reform is to ensure that rape is
viewed not only as a crime of violence, but a crime of hate,
targeting women on the basis of their gender. We, as a society,
must come to accept that rape is a violent form of discrimination
parallel to other bias-related crimes. 140 Whether intentional or
not, the recent inclusion of gender within hate crime legislation
provides an ideal basis for the next phase of rape reform. The
states that protect gender should begin to prosecute rape as a
hate crime, and the states that do not include gender in their
hate crime legislation should do so at once.
Contrary to popular belief, stranger rape comprises less
than one quarter of all rapes that are perpetrated. 14 ' Seventyeight percent of victims know their perpetrator 142 while only
twenty-two percent fall prey to a stranger.143
As one
commentator has noted, rape and the fear of rape was and
remains to be a tool that "help[s] to subordinate women as a
group."1 This subordination is clear when one takes notice of
women's attempts to alter their lifestyles to avoid becoming
statistics.145 Studies show that women accommodate the fear of
rape by restricting their behavior. 146
For example,
139 See National Victim Center, 1 INFOLINK 1, 1 (No. 36, 1992) ("Rape is a
violent crime not a sexual act. The myth that men who rape women are sexually
deprived or pathological has begun to be dispelled and replaced with an
understanding that rape is an act of power and control, rather than lust."); see also
BROWNMILLER, supra note 135 (stating that rape was traditionally a crime of
uncontrolled sexual passion and now it is a crime of violence).
140 See Goldscheid, supra note 58, at 123.

141 See CRAVEN, supra note 17 (noting that about nine percent of rapes are
committed by a family member, twenty-nine percent at the hands of an intimate,
and forty percent are committed by an acquaintance); see also TJADEN & THOENNES,

supra note 17 (noting that nearly twenty-five percent of the surveyed women-only
including victims who reported rape by intimates as a crime-reported that they
had been raped by a current or former spouse, cohabiting partner, or date, at some
time in their lives, with 1.5 % reporting they had been victimized in the previous
year).
142 See CRAVEN, supra note 17.
143 See id.

144 Pendo, supra note 7, at 172.
145 See THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF 1991, S. REP. No. 197, 102d

Cong., 1st Sess. At 38-39 (1991) (statement of Bonnie J. Campbell, Attorney
General of Iowa).

146 See id. (stating as examples: avoiding public transportation, not walking in
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approximately three-quarters of women refuse to attend movies
at night without a companion because of the fear of rape, 14 7 and
not ride
approximately fifty percent of women, if alone, will
148
public transit, if alone, after dark for the same reason.
C. Rape and the Hate Crime Paradigm
Rape is clearly and logically a crime of hate. More than any
other gender-related offense, rape is committed against women
as women 149 and perpetuates a sexually stratified society. As
pointed out by one scholar, "Statistics on female victims of
violent crimes exhibit a consistent and unusual pattern that
suggests women are targeted for sexual violence based on their
gender."150 Ninety-seven percent of rape victims are women, 151
which demonstrates that rape is largely a crime of male-attacks
of female-victims. 152 One commentator has noted that any time
a person proceeds to act "in the face of his victim's clear lack of
consent, he is consciously hurting and degrading the woman;
whenever the rapist intentionally commits the crime, he knows
her neighborhood after dark, or walking near parks of empty lots).
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See Jonathan David Selbin, Bashers Beware: The Continuing
Constitutionalityof Hate Crime Statutes After R4.AV., 72 ORE. L. REV. 157, 159 n.8
(1992) (defining rape as a hate crime because it is "perpetrated against women on
the basis of their gender and it must be prosecuted uider both rape and hate crimes
law if the law is to effectively respond to its unique dual character"). While men are
raped it is a crime of far less prevalence. See supranote 130 and accompanying text.
150 Pendo, supra note 7, at 166.
152 Women and Violence: Hearing Before the Comm. of the Judiciary of the U.S.
Senate on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Pattern of Violent Crime Against
Women Part I, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) (opening statement of Comm.
Chairman, Sen. Biden).
152 Catharine MacKinnon, supra note 19 at 1301-02. Additionally, even in the
instance of intragender rapes, the rapist is typically male. See ALLISON &
WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 134, at 48 (noting that intragender rape of men is a
problem that is acknowledged, but there is very little known about females being
sexually assaulted by other females). For an interesting view that the act is still
gender biased when committed against a male see Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN THE LAW AND GENDER 334 (Katharine T.
Bartlett & Roseanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (quoting Carolyn M. Shafer & Marilyn
Frye, Rape and Respect, in FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et
al. eds., 1977) ("Rape is a man's act, whether it male or female man and whether it
is man relatively permanently or relatively temporarily; and being raped is a
woman's experience, whether it is a female or male woman and whether it is a
woman relatively permanently or relatively temporarily.")).
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that he is committing violence against the' victim, the sort of
which he would only commit against a woman,"153 therefore
every rape is a crime of hate. To argue that rape is not a crime
of hate but really an incident of miscommunication or amorous
intentions in a sexual coupling run afoul' 54 (as many in society
believe is the case with a date or acquaintance rape) 155 is
precisely the attitude that treating rape as a hate crime would
help to eradicate. One judge discredits the idea that date rape is
not discriminatory:
The notion that non-consensual sexually oriented conduct is
actually amorous and therefore not invidiously discriminatory
toward the victimized class is clearly wrong .... In fact, the
perception that a man is somehow less culpable in taking
inappropriate liberties with members of the female gender if
his motivations are amorous, seems to be just the type of
'animus' that is a focus of concern in gender discrimination.
Regardless of the amorous intentions of the perpetrator, nonconsensual expressions of affection that rise to the nature of
those alleged in this action are laden with disrespect for
156
women.
To further buttress this supposition that rape is truly a
crime of hate, consider the analysis of rape under the eight
elements. There is a clear fit between the hate crime paradigm
and the crime of rape.
1.

Immutable Characteristic

Rape victims are much like victims of other bias-motivated
crimes in that they are chosen, not because of who they are
individually, but because of their inclusion within a certain
group. 157 As noted by one scholar:
153 Eric Rothschild, Recognizing Another Face of Hate Crimes: Rape as a

Gender-Bias Crime, 4 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 231, 267 (1993).
15 See Goldscheid, supra note 58, at 132-35 (acknowledging an argument that
rape is not motivated by gender but rather by an uncontrollable sexual impulse); see
also Rothschild, supra note 153, at 269-70.
155 See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text, which discuss the need to
include rape as a crime of hate in order to eliminate the societal myths, such as this
one, that encapsulate rape.
156 McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1252-53 (D.Utah 1998) rev'd, 185
F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1999), vacated, Rosquist D.C.P.C. v. McCann, 529 U.S. 1126
(2000) (noting that sexual advances in the face of non-consent, no matter how
innocent, are truly discriminatory).
157 See Goldscheid, supranote 58, at 123-24 (stating that regardless of the biasmotivation, the victims are chosen because of their class status); see also Hate
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Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not
individually or at random, but on the basis of sex, because of
their membership in a group defined by gender .... Just as
women are sexually harassed based on their sex, women are
sexually assaulted based on their sex .... Any woman within
the ambit of such a man is his potential victim and, when she is
of her sex. But for her sex,
harassed, is disadvantaged because
158
she would not be so treated.

Because rape is predicated upon a characteristic common to
all women-their gender-the fear of becoming a victim is
instilled upon the target group of women at large. Women
certainly feel more vulnerable after learning that a rape has
occurred because they cannot alter their gender, which was the
motivation behind the rape.159
2.

Interchangeability of Victim

The leading argument againsttreating rape as a hate crime
is that a rape victim cannot necessarily be interchanged with
any other female particularly when the rape is committed by an
acquaintance. 160 Opponents argue that acquaintance rape and
domestic violence, while certainly despicable, are automatically
excluded the definition of a hate crime because the offender is
not looking for any woman. Rather the offender is looking for
this specific woman; therefore the victim cannot be
interchangeable and does not fit the requirements of a hate
crime.' 6 1 This argument, however, fails for a number of reasons.
Crimes Statistic Act of 1988: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the
Constitutionality of the Comm. On the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, S. 702, S. 797
and S. 2000, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1988) (quoting testimony of Joan C. Weiss,
Executive Director of the National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence) (noting
that impact of ethnoviolence is parallel to the impact of a rape).
158 MacKinnon, supranote 19, at 1301-13.
159 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 597. (explaining that despite efforts to alter
behavior, women cannot necessarily escape sexual attack since they are unable to
change their "immutable characteristics" which cause the attacks).
160 See, e.g., Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 36; Kathleen Hendrix, Defining
Controversy; ProfessorRaises FurorBy Claiming Date Rape Statistics Are Inflated,
L.A. TIMES, July 9, 1991, at El (reporting on statement of Professor Neil Gilbert
that "comparing real rape to date rape is like comparing cancer to the common
cold."); Rothschild, supra note 86 at 277 (arguing that certain instances of rape can
be treated as hate crimes based upon an examination of the facts, but that
acquaintance rape while deserving of a label of rape do not satisfy the requirements
necessary to be designated a hate crime).
161 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 37 (quoting Professor McDevitt of
Northeastern University); see also CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, VIOLENCE
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To assume that a rape victim is not interchangeable fails to
acknowledge the fact that while a woman does not have to fear
that she could have been that particularwoman, it suffices to
say she felt an increased vulnerability because she realized she
could have been raped walking down her block or by her most
recent date.162 Similarly, a woman that has committed to a
unhealthy marital relationship does not have to feel that she
could have been raped by the man she learns about, rather it
suffices if she feels that she, too, is vulnerable to spousal rape in
her own marriage.163 It is precisely this feeling of affect by the
target community that demonstrates the interchangeability of
64
victims.1
Similarly, to argue that females are not interchangeable in
the commission of a rape is to ignore how many women try to
alter their lifestyles to avoid becoming a victim of a rape
precisely because they are aware of their vulnerability. 165 To
argue that acquaintance rapes are excluded from being treated
as a hate crime because they are committed upon a specific
victim with whom the defendant has a relationship (of some
degree) fails to take account of other hate crimes in which the
perpetrator and victim are acquaintances. For example, a white
man burning a cross on his African American neighbor's lawn, or
a high school student-athlete desecrating a teammate's place of
worship, are both accepted as hate crimes in which the victims
could have been interchanged despite the familiarity between
victim and perpetrator. 166 If anything, because security is
associated with social interactions, the effects of a crime are
intensified when committed by someone the victim knows.

AGAINST WOMEN AS BIAS MOTIVATED CRIME; DEFINING THE ISSUE 13 (1991)

(stating that opponents feel that if there is a preexisting relationship, the
interchangeability requirement automatically fails); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF
BIAI B'RITH, HATE CRIME STATUTES: INCLUDING WOMEN AS VICTIMS 12 (1990)

(noting that the salient factor in a spousal or acquaintance rape is the relationship
between the individual and the perpetrator, whether the defendant was a woman
hater is irrelevant).
162 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 596 (acknowledging the implicit threat to
women as a group after a violent attack of an individual woman).
163 See id.
16 See Finn, supra note 64, at 10 (finding that the fear instilled in a community
because of a hate crime demonstrates the fear of being interchanged with the
victim).
165 See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
166 See Pendo, supra note 7, at 168.
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Although, unfamiliarity between the victim and the perpetrator
certainly characterizes many hate crimes, it does not undercut
the interchangeability of the victim.167 To argue such a position
fails to acknowledge the various studies reflecting the mental
processes of a rapist. 68 For instance, some studies indicate that
rapists rape because women are collectively responsible for the
hardships and problems that the rapist has experienced in his
life. 1 69 Surveys of college students, among whom acquaintance
rape is quite frequent, demonstrate that men do not base their
decisions to commit rapes on the individual, but admit that any
are
that
victims
will
do' 7 0-- demonstrating
woman
71'
interchangeable.
Increased Fear Among the Target Group
Because the motivating factor behind a rape is the victim's
gender, the target community-namely those people who share
this trait-feel a sudden sense of anxiety and fear. 7 2 Women as
a group come to realize their own vulnerability, acknowledging
that 'it could have been me,' when they learn of a rape. Women
acknowledge that they, like the victim, share a common
characteristic that the perpetrator is seeking to violate and very
often will take steps to protect themselves that are of little or no
1
help because the immutable characteristic cannot be altered. '3
3.

167 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 37 (noting that victim
interchangeability is found in many bias crimes and therefore should be viewed as
an inclusive, rather than preclusive, factor).
168 See David Lisak, Ph.D. Assoc. Prof. Clinical Psych., U. Mass., Boston, and
Dir., Men's Sexual Trauma Proj., INTERVIEW WITH A RAPIST: Transcriptfrom a
Study of Acquaintance Rapists (Boston: Univ. of Mass. 1997); see also Diana Scully
& Joseph Marolla, Riding the Bull at Gilley's: Convicted Rapists Describe the
Rewards of Rape, 32 SOC. PROB. 252, 261 (1985).
169 See Scully & Marolla, supra note 168 ("Women are seen as collectively liable
for the rapists' problems .... In other cases, victims were thought to represent all
women, and rape was used to punish, humiliate and 'put them in their place.' ").
170 See Lisak, supra note 168 (documenting techniques used by fraternity
rapists to target women, any women, for invitations to frat parties at which they ply
women with alcohol and take them to pre-designated rooms to have sexual
intercourse with them, notwithstanding their objections).
171 Even if one were to accept the assertion that women are not interchangeable
the argument still misses the point; these eight characteristics are inclusive and the
lack of one should not necessarily preclude hate crimes prosecution.
172 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 596.
173 See Rothschild, supra note 153, at 268 (stating that women learn rules about
how to protect themselves and how to restrict their lives at a young age). "In short,
women learn their place and their fear very early. Women... know they cannot go
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Heightened Communal Impact

Similarly, the community at large feels a heightened sense
of impact when a rape has occurred. Rape, more so than any
other bias-crime, will affect society at large. 7 4 This impact is so
devastating in the instance of a rape because there are very few
men that do not have, at least to some degree, a relationship
with a woman, whether mother, sister, wife, friend, etc.
Therefore when a rape transpires, women and men alike, sense
the fear and sadness that accompanies a harm of this
magnitude. Women obviously fear for themselves and other
women while men grow concerned that the victim could have
been their mother, sister, wife, or daughter. 175
5.

Heightened Psychological Trauma
Bias-crime victims have been compared to rape victims in a
number of studies because the physical harm associated with the
crime, however great, is less significant than the powerful
accompanying emotional sense of violation 7 6
Many
commentators have noted that " 'rape... is a degrading, violent
act, which violates the bodily integrity of the victim and
frequently causes severe, long-lasting.., psychic harm.' "177 The
effects of rape, in addition to any immediate physical injury, risk
of pregnancy, or threat of sexually transmitted disease, are
severe and long lasting 7 8 Like bias-crime victims, rape victims
report various forms of serious emotional harm or some form of

places men can go without the fear of being attacked and violated. Campuses,
parking lots, libraries, shopping centers, parks, jogging trials-all are possible
danger zones." Id.
174 See Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence:Impact Upon and Response of Victims and
the Community, in AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL REPONSES, 174, 182
(Robert J. Kelly ed., 1993) (comparing rape to ethnoviolence and noting that both
affect the whole community).
175 See Rothschild, supra note 153, at 268 (explaining that violence against
women terrorizes women as a whole).
176 See id.
177Schafran, supra note 17, at 439 n.7 (quoting Justice Figueroa in People v.
Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984)).
178 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 30 (discussing the possibility of
resulting pregnancy or the risk of contracting HIV because of a rape). For a more
thorough discussion of the psychological after-effects of rape, see Martha A. Holmes
& Janet S. St. Lawrence, Treatment of Rape Induced Trauma:ProposedBehavioral
Conceptualization and Review of the Literature, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 417
(1983).
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Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).179 PTSD, a chronic
psychological condition, is typically characterized by diminished
self-worth, fearfulness and anxiety, hostility and blame,
sleeplessness, phobic responses, coping difficulties, depressed
expectations for the future, extreme fear, and helplessness. 180
Self-blame, impaired relationships, and sexual dysfunction are
also typical after-effects of a rape. 181 One study revealed that,
similar to bias-crime victims, one-half of rape survivors
contemplate suicide. 182 The National Victim Center reports that
one-third of all rape victims will develop rape-related PTSD and
are thirteen-times more likely than victims of ordinary assaults
to develop major alcohol dependency and abuse problems. 183
Similarly, rape victims are twenty-six times more likely than
other assault victims to develop major drug problems, usually
resulting from prescribed medication used to quell the mental
pain associated with a rape. 184 Additionally, rape victims are
likely to experience psychological symptoms such as depression
or withdrawal and will often be overly sensitive in anticipation of
85
contact with other members of society.1
These psychological impacts are suffered regardless of
whether the victim knew her assailant or not. 186 In fact, women
who knew their assailant may suffer more profound effects
because they also experience feelings of betrayal and heightened
self-blame.187 One commentator has noted that the impact of
rape by a known assailant can be more traumatizing than the
impact of rape by a stranger:
179 See id.; see also Pendo, supra note 7, at 164; Bridget A. Clarke, Comment,
Making the Women's Experience Relevant to Rape: The Admissibility of Rape
Trauma Syndrome in California, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 251 (1991) (recognizing rape
trauma syndrome as a set of identifiable symptoms suffered by victims of sexual
assault); MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 40-46
(1989) (same). For judicial recognition of the severe trauma and harms inflicted
upon rape survivors, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598-99, 611-12 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
180 See Pendo, supra note 7, at 164.
181 See Christine Gidycz & Mary P. Koss, The Effects of Acquaintance Rape on
the Female Victim, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 270 (Andrea Parrot
& Laurie Bechhofer, eds., 1991).
182 See id. at 275.
183 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 31 n.94.
184 See id.
185 See Lawrence, supranote 65, at 345-47.
186 See id.
187 See MacKinnon, supra note 19, at 188.
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Because rape by a known assailant occurs in a context
otherwise associated with safety and privacy, the victim may
experience an intense sense of betrayal: Women feel as much, if
not more, traumatized by being raped by someone we have
known and trusted, someone we have shared at least an
illusion of mutuality with, than by some stranger. 188

6.

Underreporting by Victims
Like all other hate crimes, rape is characterized by
significant underreporting. 189 This is attributed to the fact that
rape victims feel that the police either could not or would not
help them. 9 0 The victims attribute this distrust to the fact that
they often suffer a second time at the hands of an insensitive and
gender-biased criminal justice system and because of social
beliefs at large. 19 1
Rape victims are correct in their perception. Studies have
shown the prevalence of judicial bias against rape victims 92 .
The victim is often the one put on trial, with jurors focusing on
193
extraneous factors like their clothing, lifestyle and demeanor.
Additionally, studies of jury behavior and attitude reveal poorly
disguised hostility toward rape victims, whom juries view as
bringing the rape upon themselves by "conduct such as drinking,

Pendo, supra note 7, at 173.
189 See Department of Justice, Sixty Percent of Convicted Sex Offenders Are on
Parole or Probation, February 2, 1997, at http//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/presssoo.
pr (noting that one-third of rapes are reported). For statistics showing that this
number is smaller, approximately one-fifth, when the rapist is an intimate see
TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 17.
190 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 17 (demonstrating that in addition to
fearing that police either could not or would not help, twenty-one percent of victims
expressed concern that the assailant would retaliate while another twenty-six
percent said they were too ashamed); see also Shenny F. Colb, Assuming Facts Not
in Evidence, 25 RUTGERs L.J. 745, 755 (1994) (noting that psychologists attribute
the failure of a victim to report rape stems, in part, from the stigma attaching to
victims).
191 See The Violence Against Women Act of 1991: The Civil Rights Remedy- A
National Call For Protection Against Gender Based Discrimination, S. REP. NO.
197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 34-39 (1991); see also Schafran, supra note 17, at 441
(noting that in 1987 the average sentence for robbery was twenty-nine percent
greater than that for rape).
192 See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalizing, 73 CAL. L.
Rzv. 523, 576 (2000) (illustrating that until recently, courts would allow defendants
to argue, and juries to infer, that women who had not promptly reported an alleged
rape had not, in fact, been raped).
193 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 31.
188
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wearing seductive clothing, or accepting a ride with the
1 94
assailant."
The following examples are illustrative of the social
perceptions of rape victims: a Texas gubernatorial candidate was
asked about his thoughts on rape and he replied, "Rainy weather
is like a woman being raped; if it's inevitable just relax and enjoy
it"195; a Wisconsin judge while presiding over the brutal rape of a
mere baby, labeled the five-year old child "an unusually
promiscuous lady," and found her responsible for the assault 9 6;
and a New York Judge after presiding over a rape trial stated
that while the defendant "did go into [the victim's] apartment
without permission... I think [the sexual intercourse] started
without consent, but maybe they ended up enjoying
themselves." 97 These statements are demonstrative of the
barriers rape victims must surmount to have the violent crimes
committed against them acknowledged
and punished
accordingly. Another example of judicial bias is that some
judges impose light sentences in the absence of "slash and bash"
evidence. 198 But the uphill battle does not end here. Rather,
victims are very aware of the many "rape-myths" that pervade
society and must ask themselves if it is really worth it to report
this rape, or am I really going to suffer at the hands of the police
and criminal justice system. 9 9 Unfortunately, in light of severe
underreporting of rape incidents, we are already aware of the
usual rape victim's answer.

194 DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE

LAW 248 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989).
195 See ALLISON & WRIGHTSmAN, supra note 134, at 1 (quoting an undisclosed
1990 Texas gubernatorial candidate in order to demonstrate the lack of sympathy
that accompanies a rape accusation).
196 See RHODE, supra note 194, at 249 (portraying the incident and then
ridiculing this unidentified Judge as a disgrace to society).
19 Id.
198 See Schafran, supra note 17, at 441 ("[J]udges' sentencing practices
frequently ignore victims' psychological injuries and miniTie the seriousness of the
crime when there is no evidence of physical injury as it is commonly understood, i.e.,
bashing and slashing.").
199 See Kristin Aggeler, Is ADHD a 'Handy Excuse"? Remedying JudicialBias
Against ADHD, 68 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 459, 477 (2000) (stating that rape myths make
it difficult to establish that a rape has occurred because they reinforce the
suggestion that a rape victim may be lying). Rape myths have at times been
included in a formal jury instruction. See id.
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Serial Nature of Attacks and Recidivism

The worst fear of any traumatized person is that the
traumatic event will have to be relived, 20 0 and for the rape victim
this is very possible. Research shows that victims that have
been raped have a very significant chance of being raped
again.201 On average, thirty-nine percent of rape victims have
20 2
been raped more than one time on separate occasions.
Similarly, an assailant is prone to multiple offenses.
For
example, approximately eight percent of 2,214 rapists released
from prison in 1983 were re-arrested for a new rape within
three-years. 20 3 Compared to other prisoners who served time for
another offense rapists were ten and one-half percent more likely
20 4
to be arrested for a subsequent rape.
8.

Heightened Violence

Rape has been considered a crime of violence since as early
Like all bias-crimes, rape is excessively violent in
nature. 2 6 Many studies have shown that "rape is one of the
20 7
most brutal, invasive, and degrading forms of victimization,"
and in addition to the injury that is inherent in the sexual act,
208
many rape victims require significant hospital treatment.

as

1975.205

See JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 86 (1992).
See Schafran, supra note 17, at 448.
See id. For a more thorough discussion on the rate and reasons for multiple
victimization, see National Victim Center and Crime Victims Res. and Treatment
Center, Med. Univ. of South Carolina, in RAPE IN AMERICA (1992).
203 See Dept. of Justice, supranote 189.
204 See id.
205 See BROWNMILLER, supra note 135, at 14-15 (arguing that rape is not a
crime of sex or passion but rather a crime of violence that places all women in a
state of fear).
200
201
202

206 See CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS
BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME: DEFINING THE ISSUE 10 (1991) ("Many crimes

against women involve excessive violence that characterizes bias-motivated hate
crimes."); see also Angelari, supra note 59, at 66 (noting that rape attacks are
frequently devoid of any criminal motive and are excessively violent in nature).
207 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 134, at 152-61 (1993) (emphasis
added).
208 See TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 17 (finding that a little more than
thirty-six percent of women raped by an intimate since the age of eighteen-years old
sustained an injury other than that inherent in the rape itself, and about one-half of
these women required immediate medical care).
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HI. THE NEXT STEP IN RAPE LAW REFORM
The remaining argument against the inclusion of rape as a
crime of hate is even less compelling than those already
addressed. Many opponents fear that the inclusion of rape
would overwhelm the criminal justice system and stall the
passage of progressive legislation and implementations of other
hate crime issues.209 The fear that inclusion of rape will
overwhelm the system, in both funding and enforcement, should
be the greatest justification for the inclusion of rape as a crime of
hate. This concern demonstrates the prevalence of rape and
gender discrimination that permeates our culture. Exclusion of
21 0
rape would, therefore, be a terrible mistake.
Because rape fits within the hate crime paradigm, society
must take the next step and embrace the idea that rape is a
crime of hate. Doing this will serve a two-fold purpose. First, it
will assist in increasing the average length of incarceration of a
21
rapist and in turn assist in specific and general deterrence. '
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, rather than just
increasing the sentence of a rapist, labeling rape a crime of hate
will serve the expressive purpose of the law, validate the victims'
experience, and send an unambiguous message that such actions
are intolerable. The societal belief in the injustice of hate is
reinforced and victims are reassured of their worth as members
of our polity when steps are taken to deter hate-motivated
behavior. Most importantly, a label of hatred will help to
eliminate the rape myths in society and symbolically heal the
wounds of those that become victims of such injustice.
A.

Penalty Enhancementis Appropriatefor Rape

Penalty enhancements are appropriate despite the supposed
severe penalties currently imposed upon convicted rapists. 2 2 An
enhanced penalty system is justified by the median-time served
by convicted rapists, the recidivist rate of offenders, and the
209 See Fernandez, supra note 61, at 275 (noting that the same opposition
occurred when lobbyists were trying to include "gender" within hate crime statutes).
210 See Rothschild, supra note 153, at 275 (analogizing the exclusion of rape in
gender-biased crimes to the exclusion of lynching in racial-biased crimes).
211 See DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 37-40 (defining specific and general

deterrence).
212 See, e.g., Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that in thirteen

percent of all cases no incarceration is imposed at all).
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percent of offenders that are immediately released into the
community. 2 13 According to one report, "Both the average
sentence length and the minimum time to be served in prison
[recently] decreased for rape offenders." 214 The average length of
sentence dropped from 153 months to 140 months,2 15 while the
average time served for a rape conviction in prison dropped from
ninety months to seventy-two months. 2 16 On average, a little
over fifty percent of a sentence for a conviction of rape is
2 17
served.
If these statistics were accurate, women may consider
themselves relatively safe. Unfortunately, these statistics are
not true in every rape conviction. In 1996, a total of seventynine percent of all sexual assaults brought before a state court
resulted in some form of incarceration. 2 18 Sixty-three percent of
those resulted in a sentence to time in prison, to which the above
median time is applicable. 2 19 Sixteen percent resulted in a
sentence to be served in a local jail, for which the average
sentence imposed for all felonies is eight months, six months of
which are served on average. 220 Even more disturbing is the
realization that twenty-one percent of rapists that are convicted
are sentenced solely to probation, meaning that no time is spent
behind bars and the average length of supervision imposed is
three and one-half years.22 1 The minimal amount of punishment
imposed upon men that desecrate a woman's body and reduce
society's security, compounded by the rate of recidivism, justifies
a heightened penalty.
This increased penalty, assuming it is proper in light of the
current statistics of time served and rates of recidivism, can be
justified in two ways. First the heightened sentence would stay
213 See Paula M. Ditton & Doris James Wilson, Truth in Sentencing, Jan. 1999,

at httpJ/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/tssp.txt (detailing the amount of time
served by offenders while in prison, and noting that it is almost always shorter than
the time they are sentenced to serve).
214 Id.

215 See id.
216 See id.

217 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 41 (noting that convicted rapists
serve a median time of only 47 months).
218 See Jodi Brown et al., Felony Sentences in State Courts, May 1999, at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/fssc96.txt.
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See id.
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within morally prescribed bounds of proportionality 222 since it
would reflect the three levels of increased harm that result: the
increased psychological harm to the victim; the increased sense
of fear and vulnerability imposed upon the target community;
and the fear imposed upon the community in general. Second,
the increased penalty is justified because it will have an impact
based on both specific and general deterrence principles. 223 An
interesting argument against the deterrence-serving function of
the increased penalty asserts that hate crime perpetrators when
incarcerated with those that they despise will only increase and
intensify the existing hatred, ultimately undermining the
deterrence purpose of the incarceration. 224 While there is
certainly some credence to this argument, the opposite is likely
true for a male convicted of rape as he is relegated to the position
of his very own victim. He will learn to live in continual fear of
violation and assault and will be forced to have to make
adjustments in his daily living to avoid falling prey to sexual
advances of other inmates. 225 These two justifications, however,
cannot, standing alone, justify prosecuting rape as a crime of
hate, and therefore subjecting rape to an increased penalty,
because if this sufficed, then all the legislatures would have to do
is add years to rape penalties.
B.

The Expressive Purpose of ProsecutingRape as a Hate Crime

A purpose of the law is to reflect the moral sentiment of
society.226 Therefore, a penalty should reflect the community's
222 For an interesting discussion on the concept of proportionality and the 8th
Amendment's prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment see Coker v. Georgia,

433 U.S. 584, 598-99 (1977) (finding that the death penalty for a rape of an adult
woman was disproportionate and specifically forbidden by the 8th Amendment).

223 See Lawrence, supra note 65, at 354 (discussing the need to increase
punishment for bias-crimes based upon both a culpability and harm analysis). For a
thorough discussion of principles of deterrence, see DRESSLER, supra note 94, at 15.
224 See Craig L. Urich, Comment, Hate Crime Legislation:A PolicyAnalysis, 36
Hous. L. REV. 1467, 1493 (1999) (noting that for someone with severe hatred of
lesbians and gays who is forced into homosexual activities in prison, prison may
intensify the already strong hatred of homosexuals).
225 See JAMES

GILLIGAN, VIOLENCE 163-90,

174 (1996) (describing the

likelihood that an inmate will "get raped within the first twenty-four to forty-eight
hours. That's almost standard.") (citation omitted). These incidents often involve
gang-rapes by as many as fourteen individuals. See id. at 176.
226 See JAMES FIT7JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 81-82 (1883 ed.) (asserting that a sentence converts "into a final
judgement of what might otherwise be a transient sentiment"); see also JOEL
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moral sensibilities and indignation with the act committed 227
since the law is special social convention that signifies moral
condemnation of the offender. 228 The law is, therefore, an
affirmation that society stands behind the values it believes
in.229 A hate crime label would add to society's already existent
condemnation of rapists, in that this crime would be recognized
as a kind of terrorism 230 specifically directed at a class of
people-namely women-that creates a special injury for the
class. The label will also give expression to the hatred and
disgust that is excited by the commission of a bias-crime.
Rape, like other crimes of hate, inflicts physical as well as
intangible injuries. 231 These intangible injuries send a symbolic
message to the victim-a message that the perpetrator has value
and "counts" but that the victim is worthless. 23 2 It can be
interpreted then, that the way in which society reacts to one's
victimization is a reflection of how valuable society believes the
victim to be. This in turn can be seen as a reflection of how
important one's existence really is. 233 Therefore, if rape were
classified as a crime of hate, society and the criminal justice
system would in effect be saying that the value of the victim is
significant and that the symbolic meaning behind a rape-of
devaluing a woman-is undermined and negated. 23 4 If, on the
other hand, the criminal justice system does not treat rape as a
crime of hate, it is in unequivocal terms telling a rape survivor
FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING, Essays in the Theory of Responsibility, 95-118
(1970) (discussing in great detail the expressive purpose of the law and the goals of

punishment).
227 See Dan M. Kahan, Response: Between Economics and Sociology: The New
Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477,2483 (1997) ("By selecting an affliction of
the appropriate form and severity, the community expresses condemnation of the
wrongdoer and reaffirms its commitment to the values that the wrongdoer's own act
denies.").
228 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 593 (1996).
229 See id. at 607.
230 See Stephen L. Pomerantz, THE FBI AND TERRORISM, FBI LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Oct. 1987, at 14 (noting that bias-crimes fit the FBI
definition of terrorism). Terrorism is "[t]he unlawful use of force or violence against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or
any segment thereof in the furtherance of political or social objectives." Id.
231 See Weisburg & Levin, supra note 6, at 30.
232 See id at 24-25.
233 See Pomerantz, supra note 230, at 7.
234 See id. at 5 (stating that a crime has symbolic meaning and so too does the
punishment imposed).
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that she is not valuable enough for society to construct a
235
significant protective barrier-namely a label of hate.
Therefore the idea is that the label of a hate crime, which sets off
bells in the minds of law abiding citizens that a grievous
injustice has been committed, will be properly expressive of the
perpetrator's and the victim's value. To a degree this label will
serve as a way to symbolically heal the injuries sustained by,
and remove the "price tag" placed upon, the victim.
Simultaneously, prosecuting rape as a hate crime will reaffirm
the message that any form of rape will not be tolerated and will
enable victims to gain confidence in the criminal justice system
and prompt reports of rape.
A hate crime label will also assist in removing the social
stereotypes and myths that pervade a rape case. By focusing on
the vile conduct of the defendant, the legal system may well lose
its fascination with the conduct of the victim. 236 As one scholar
has noted, "focusing on the bias involved in the particular
rape ...may direct emphasis away from the sexual nature of the
act... and eradicate the societal myth that rape is a misguided
sexual urge."237 It has been shown that rape convictions
regularly fail because of the prevalence of myths that surround
the crime.238 Consider the article by New York Supreme Court
Justice Richard T. Andrias, which lists seven common rape
myths: a true victim of a rape will immediately seek out and
complain to family, friends or the police; a rape usually occurs at
night, out of doors, and between strangers; the perpetrator uses
a weapon and leaves the victim physically injured; rape is an
expression of sexual (albeit misplaced) desire; women regularly
falsely accuse men of rape; a woman invites sexual assault by
her dress, behavior, or being alone in the wrong place; a woman's
prior consensual sexual relations with the accused or with others
known to the accused implies consent; a woman impaired by
drugs/alcohol desires to be raped. 239 It is precisely these falsities,

235 See id at 7. The murder of a young homosexual by a heterosexual male who

was let off with a mere slap on the wrist, as portrayed by Kahan, demonstrates that
the victim lacked value in comparison to the perpetrator. See id.
236 See Weisburd & Levin, supra note 6, at 41.
237 Angelari, supra note 59, at 103.

238 See supra notes 189-99 and accompanying text (discussing the
underreporting of victims because of an insensitive criminal justice system).
239 See Richard T. Andrias, Rape Myths, 7 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. 3, 3 (1992).
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and others 240 that enable the criminal justice system to fail
women. I suggest that treating rape as a hate crime will deflect
the emphasis away from the victim and emphasize the
significance of the violence. Inclusion of rape as a hate crime
will certainly help combat these myths by telling society that
rape is a crime that occurs not because a woman asked for it or
deserved it, but because of her gender. A label of hate will aid
the nation in adjusting its attitude toward rape and will
241
empower victims and help heal their wounds.
CONCLUSION
The statistics prove that rape is a problem of epidemic
proportion. In light of this, it is evident that women are in need
of a tool that will help increase the success rate of prosecutions
and validate their worth as people. Labeling rape a crime of
hate is an ideal means to achieve the necessary ends. Rape fits
within the hate crime paradigm and it has been demonstrated
that rape is certainly motivated, in part, by one's gender. By
labeling rape a crime of hate, society is clearly validating the
worth and experience of millions of women and helping to heal
unjustly inflicted wounds, while securing the sexual autonomy of
its members and properly condemning the men that instill terror
based upon gender. It is also possible that the label of hate will
erase the social myths that overwhelm the crime of rape and
hinder the success of prosecutions. By putting an end to these
myths, society will help to empower women to gain confidence in
a criminal justice system that has long prevented rape
prosecutions and enable women to report and prosecute rapes
successfully. The enhanced penalty that would accompany a
conviction of a hate crime is appropriate in light of the median
time a rapist spends behind bars, if any, and because of the
240 See Lisa Heinzerling, So Rape Isn't Hatred?L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1990, at B-7.
Heinerling states,
We are not, it is true, accustomed to thinking of crimes against women in
the same way that we think of racial or ethnic violence. We tend, instead,
to treat brutalizing acts against women either as isolated cases-that is, as
events brought about by some specific characteristic or conduct of the
victim--or, in rare cases, as manifestation of racial or ethnic hatred.

Id.
21 See MacKinnon, supra note 152, at 1302 (stating that inclusion of rape as a
crime of hate will empower victims and make the problem of rape, and its associated
violence, visible in a culture that normalizes and eroticizes sexual force).
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likelihood that a rape perpetrator will commit multiple rapes in
a career of crime. In addition, labeling rape a crime of hate will
educate the populous at large that rape is not a crime of sex, nor
a crime of violence alone, but rather rape is a crime of hate
committed against women precisely because they are women.
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